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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from an interlocutory order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County. Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, on March 20, 
2007 this Court entered an Order granting the Molers' Petition for Permission to Appeal 
an Interlocutory Order (R. 1770). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0). 
in 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
(1) Whether the trial court erred by failing to conclude that Ms. Moler-Lewis is 
a "representative" of her parents under Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(4) whose 
communications with her parents and their counsel are therefore protected by the 
attorney-client privilege; and 
(2) If Ms. Moler-Lewis is a "representative" for purposes of Rule 504(a)(4), 
whether the trial court erred by holding that the Molers waived the privilege by testifying 
about conversations predating their appointment of Ms. Moler-Lewis as their 
representative. 
The Molers preserved these issues below by: (a) refusing to allow Mr. Moler to 
testify about conversations with his daughter relating to the litigation after the 
commencement of litigation (See R. 1178-79 (deposition testimony of Dennis Moler)); 
and (b) by opposing Defendants' motion to compel documents and testimony reflecting 
such conversations (See R. 1154-1206). 
Under Utah law, "the existence of a privilege is a question of law for the court," 
and the trial court's ruling on the existence of a privilege is ""reviewfed] for correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial court's determination." State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 
88 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Utah 1997)). 
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The trial court's finding that a privilege was waived is also a legal conclusion that is 
reviewed, "for correctness." Doe v. Maret. 1999 UT 74, ^  6, 984 P.2d 980 (Utah 1999). 
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DETERMINATIVE RULES 
The following Rules of Evidence are determinative of this appeal, or are of central 
importance to this appeal: 
(1) Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(1): A "client" is a person, including a public 
officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either 
public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, 
or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal 
services. 
(2) Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(4): A "representative of the client" is one 
having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice 
rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, or one specifically 
authorized to communicate with the lawyer concerning a legal matter. 
(3) Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(5): A "communication" includes advice 
given by the lawyer in the course of representing the client and includes 
disclosures of the client and the client's representatives to the lawyer or the 
lawyer's representative incidental to the professional relationship. 
(4) Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(6): A communication is "confidential" if not 
intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom 
disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to 
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the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the 
communication. 
(5) Utah Rule of Evidence 504(b): General rule of privilege. A client has a 
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from 
disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating 
the rendition of professional legal services to the client between the client 
and the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and 
lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, and among the 
client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and lawyers 
representing others in matters of common interest, in any combination. 
(6) Utah Rule of Evidence 504(c): Who may claim the privilege. The privilege 
may be claimed by the client, the client's guardian or conservator, the 
personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or 
similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization, 
whether or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer at the time of 
the communication is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege on 
behalf of the client. 
(7) Utah Rule of Evidence 507(a): A person upon whom these rules confer a 
privilege against disclosure of the confidential matter or communication 
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waives the privilege if the person or a predecessor while holder of the 
privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of any 
significant part of the matter or communication, or fails to take reasonable 
precautions against inadvertent disclosure. This rule does not apply if the 
disclosure is itself a privileged communication. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In early 2002 the Defendants were actively marketing a new residential planned 
unit development in Sandy, Utah, known as Redfeather Estates. A key component of 
Defendants' marketing was the fact that residency in Redfeather was and always would 
be limited to households where at least one person was 55 years of age or older. When 
Defendants obtained plat approval from the Sandy City Planning Commission, 
Defendants were instructed to include the age restriction within the Redfeather 
Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions ("CC&Rs"). Accordingly, the age restriction was 
stated and restated throughout the original Redfeather CC&Rs, and was mentioned 
prominently in Redfeather advertising materials. 
Dennis Moler spent more than thirty-five years as an agent in the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation. In 2002, when his retirement was imminent, he and his wife Marilynn 
began looking to build a home in a community consisting of homeowners fifty-five years 
or older. In March 2002, the Molers became aware of Redfeather Estates and contacted 
McCandless to discuss the possible purchase of a residence. During this initial 
conversation—and in every conversation that occurred thereafter—McCandless 
represented to the Molers that Redfeather Estates was solely for individuals over fifty-
five years of age. The Molers and McCandless then met on numerous occasions to 
discuss this possible purchase. During those conversations, McCandless stated that 
ix 
Redfeather Estates would be the first gated community in Sandy for individuals over 
fifty-five years of age, and showed the Molers how the residences were being constructed 
for mature adults. The Molers were sold. This was the home—and the community—in 
which they expected to spend the rest of their lives. 
On April 23, 2002, the Molers and Franklin Homes1 executed a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract (the "Contract") for construction of a home in Redfeather Estates. The 
Contract called for the Molers to pay $215,900.00 for a residence to be constructed at 
Redfeather Estates. The Molers provided a $ 1,000 earnest money deposit on that date in 
accordance with the terms of the Contract. During that meeting McCandless repeatedly 
mentioned the 55 and over restriction, and he read through the Original CC&Rs with the 
Molers. The Contract expressly incorporated several other documents, including the 
Original CC&Rs that expressly limited Redfeather Estate ownership to individuals over 
fifty-five years of age. The Contract established October 30, 2002 as the "Substantial 
Completion Deadline." Closing was scheduled for two days after the Molers received 
notice that construction was substantially complete. On May 22, 2002, the Molers met 
with Defendants, discussed various aspects of construction, and provided Franklin Homes 
Franklin Homes and its principal Quinn Heder, as well as Sunrise Capital, were named 
defendants in this action at the time the order at issue was entered by the trial court, but 
both have since been dismissed as a result of a settlement. 
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with a check for $20,590 as required by the Contract. At no time during this meeting did 
any Defendant indicate that the fifty-five and over age restriction would be removed. 
Yet unbeknownst to the Molers, at that very moment Defendants were engaging in 
unilateral efforts to change Redfeather Estates' very nature. Persons under the age of 55 
were expressing interest in Redfeather, and Defendants were growing increasingly 
desperate to sell homes. Thus, as early as April 16, 2002, the Defendants were discussing 
in their weekly project meetings the idea of lifting the age restriction to speed up sales. 
By May 14, 2002—a week before the Molers made their $20,000 payment to Defendants 
as scheduled—Defendants were already planning to petition Sandy City to remove the 
age restriction. None of the Defendants ever told the Molers that Defendants were taking 
steps to remove the age restriction—the very thing that brought the Molers to Redfeather 
in the first place. 
Despite their failure to notify the Molers of their intent to remove the age 
restriction, on June 20, 2002, McCandless met with the Sandy City Planning Commission 
to obtain approval to remove Redfeather Estates' fifty-five year or older age restriction. 
McCandless advised the Planning Commission that he had several potential buyers who 
are not yet 55 years of age but desire to live in the project, and under the current project 
approval and CC&Rs he was prohibited from selling to these individuals. The Planning 
Commission agreed to McCandless' request subject to the approval of Redfeather 
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owners. No such approval was ever sought, let alone obtained, from the Molers or any 
other homeowner. 
After convincing Sandy City that the nature of Redfeather Estates needed to be 
changed to increase sales, Defendants took the next step. On August 12, 2002, 
Defendants executed and recorded "An Amendment to the Declaration of Covenants, 
Conditions, and Restrictions and Reservation of Easements for Redfeather Estates, 
P.ILD." (the "First Amended CC&Rs"). The First Amended CC&Rs, among other 
things, purported to remove from the Redfeather Estate CC&Rs "any and all references to 
age restriction or minimum age." Unaware of this sea-change that had been made to their 
community, on September 26, 2002, the Molers upheld their end of the bargain by 
providing the remaining amounts due under the Contract and closed on the purchase of 
their residence. 
The Defendants never advised the Molers of the First Amended CC&Rs or that the 
fifty-five and over age restriction had been removed. Instead, the Defendants took 
affirmative steps to conceal what they had done. For example, in early 2005 Mr. 
McCandless visited Redfeather and spoke with the Molers at their home. The Molers and 
their daughter, Wendy Moler-Lewis, asked Mr. McCandless directly whether Redfeather 
was still a 55 and over community. Twice Mr. McCandless unequivocally responded: 
"yes." Because she was privy to these and other communications relevant to the Molers' 
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allegations, Ms. Moler-Lewis is a fact witness in this lawsuit. Although Ms. Moler-
Lewis graduated from law school and was at one time a practicing attorney, she has never 
represented her parents in this action and has never purported to do so. 
The Molers eventually learned the truth about what the Defendants had done. 
After unsuccessful efforts to resolve their disputes with the Defendants without litigation, 
the Molers decided to pursue legal action. Because they were unfamiliar with civil 
litigation, they empowered Ms. Moler-Lewis to identify a law firm to assist them with 
their dispute. After counsel was retained, Ms. Moler-Lewis remained actively involved 
in the litigation and was privy to numerous communications between her parents and 
their counsel. The Molers' Complaint, filed on February 13, 2006, alleged breach of 
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, fraudulent 
concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and violation of Utah's deceptive trade 
practices statute. 
Defendants moved to dismiss the Molers' complaint, and in the alternative for 
summary judgment, but the trial court denied both motions. (R. 598-600.) Discovery 
then proceeded, with all parties serving written discovery and taking depositions. During 
Defendants' deposition of Dennis Moler, counsel for McCandless and CW Management 
asked Mr. Moler to describe in detail all communications he has had with Ms. Moler-
Lewis concerning this lawsuit, including those where counsel was present. Counsel for 
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the Molers objected and instructed Mr. Moler not to answer. Defendants then moved to 
compel communications between Ms. Moler-Lewis and her parents concerning the 
litigation (R. 977-979A), and the Molers opposed the motion (R. 1154-1206). The court 
heard oral argument and, a few days later, granted Defendants' motion to compel. (R. 
1378-1381.) The Molers then petitioned this Court for leave to file an interlocutory 
appeal, which petition was granted on March 22, 2007. (R. 1770-1770A.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Utah Rule of Evidence 504 extends the attorney-client privilege to representatives 
of the client. In reliance upon the express language of Rule 504, the Molers appointed 
their daughter, Wendy Moler-Lewis, as their representative in connection with this 
litigation. In that capacity Ms. Moler-Lewis was authorized to, and did in fact, identify 
legal counsel to represent her parents, and then participated actively in strategic decisions 
concerning the litigation. Ms. Moler-Lewis was privy to communications between her 
parents and their counsel, received and reviewed drafts of pleadings, and discussed the 
lawsuit with her parents. At all times the Molers, their counsel, and Ms. Moler-Lewis 
were operating under the assumption—grounded in the express language of Rule 504— 
that these communications were privileged as Ms. Moler-Lewis was acting as her 
parents' representative. 
Hence, when counsel for the Defendants in this action asked Mr. Moler questions 
in his deposition about conversations he had with his daughter about the lawsuit, counsel 
for the Molers objected and instructed Mr. Moler not to answer. Defendants then moved 
to compel the production of documents and testimony reflecting communications 
between the Molers and their daughter, including communications to which the Molers' 
counsel were parties, after Ms. Moler-Lewis was appointed as her parents' representative. 
The Molers opposed Defendants' motion primarily on the ground that the 
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communications were privileged under Rule 504 because Ms. Moler-Lewis was a duly-
appointed litigation representative of her parents. The trial court granted the motion to 
compel, but never addressed whether Ms. Moler-Lewis was a "representative" as 
expressly provided for under Rule 504. The trial court instead concluded (1) that Ms. 
Moler-Lewis was not an "agent" of her parents because her services were not necessary 
for the provision of legal services, and (2) even if Ms. Moler-Lewis was an agent, the 
Molers waived any privilege when Mr. Moler was allowed to testify about conversations 
with his daughter that predated the commencement of litigation and the hiring of counsel. 
The trial court's rulings are legally incorrect for two reasons. First, Rule 504 
speaks only in terms of representatives—not agents—and nowhere requires that the 
representative's services be absolutely necessary for the provision of legal services. 
Second, the Molers could not have waived any privilege by testifying about 
conversations occurring before litigation commenced, because until litigation 
commenced or was imminent and counsel was retained, no attorney-client privilege 
existed under Rule 504. Thus, the Molers could not have refused to testify regarding the 
communications with their daughter that predated the hiring of counsel, or their 
appointment of her as their litigation representative. 
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Because the trial court's order requires the Molers to disclose communications that 
are privileged under the express terms of Rule 504, the trial court's rulings are in error 
and should be reversed. 
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FACTUAL STATEMENT 
A. Dennis & Marilynn Moler 
L Dennis and Marilyn Moler (the "Molers"), the plaintiffs in this case, had 
never been involved in civil litigation before this lawsuit. See R. 1169 (Affidavit of 
Dennis Moler ("Moler Aff.")) 14. 
2. The Molers have three daughters, one of whom is Wendy Moler-Lewis. IcL 
(R. 1169)13. 
B. Wendy Moler-Lewis 
3. Wendy Moler-Lewis received her juris doctorate degree from Creighton 
University Law School in 1999. See R. 1173 (Affidavit of Wendy Moler-Lewis ("Lewis 
Aff.")) 14. 
4. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Moler-Lewis became a member of the Utah Bar and 
joined VanCott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy ("Van Cott") for approximately three 
years as a litigation associate. Ms. Moler-Lewis left VanCott several years ago to help 
run her husband's dental practice. Id. (R. 1173) ^ 5. 
5. While employed at Van Cott, Ms. Moler-Lewis worked and became 
friendly with Evan S. Strassberg, who was also a litigation associate at the time. Mr. 
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Strassberg and Ms. Moler-Lewis have maintained a personal friendship since that time. 
IA(R. 1173)f 6. 
6. In the 2002-2005 time period, because the Molers watched Ms. Moler-
Lewis' daughter, Ms. Moler-Lewis was frequently at the Molers' residence and was well 
aware of their various efforts to deal with Defendants' fraud and other wrongful acts. Id 
(R. 1173)f 7. 
C- Ms. Moler-Lewis is a Representative of her Parents in this Litigation, 
7. In December 2005, as it became clear that litigation was inevitable, Ms. 
Moler-Lewis—at her parents' express request and authorization—helped her parents look 
for and select counsel to help the handle the litigation. Ms. Moler-Lewis telephoned at 
least two Salt Lake attorneys on her parents' behalf. IcL (R. 1173) ^ 8; Moler Aff. (R. 
1169)t5. 
8. During that same time period, Ms. Moler-Lewis received an announcement 
from Mr. Strassberg stating that he and Mr. Ensor were forming a law partnership. Lewis 
Aff. (R. 1174) If 9. 
9. Shortly thereafter, and based on her personal and professional relationship 
with Mr. Strassberg, Ms. Moler-Lewis called Mr. Strassberg and briefly explained the 
facts of her parents' case. Mr. Strassberg indicated he was interested in discussing the 
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matter further, and Ms. Moler-Lewis set up an in-person meeting with Mr. Strassberg and 
theMolers. IdL(R. 1174)f 10. 
10. The initial meeting between Mr. Strassberg and the Molers took place at the 
Molers' home in Redfeather Estates, which Ms. Moler-Lewis also attended. Id (R. 1174) 
if 11; Moler Aff.(R. 1169)f 7. 
11. At all relevant times, dating back to at least December 2005, Ms. Moler-
Lewis had the authority to obtain professional legal services, and to act on any advice 
rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of her parents. Ms. Moler-Lewis has also been 
specifically authorized to communicate with Strassberg & Ensor on this matter, and has 
done so on numerous occasions. Moler Aff. (R. 1169) f 8; Lewis Aff. (R. 1174) ^ j 12. 
12. Among other things, Ms. Moler-Lewis has spoken with her parents about 
drafts of pleadings prepared by Strassberg & Ensor, and has discussed with them strategic 
matters pertaining to the lawsuit. Moler Aff. (R. 1170) U 9; Lewis Aff. (R. 1174) f 13. 
13. Mr. Moler never intended to waive the attorney-client privilege by 
communicating with Ms. Moler-Lewis about the lawsuit. Moler Aff. (R 1170) ^ f 10. 
D. Ms. Moler-Lewis was a Client of Strassberg & Ensor, P.C. 
14. Ms. Moler-Lewis retained Strassberg & Ensor P.C. (now known as Young, 
Hoffman, Strassberg & Ensor, LLP) to represent her in relation to this matter, in 
particular in regard to her role as a witness and in response to Defendants' threats that a 
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claim for defamation might be filed. Ms. Moler-Lewis' attorney-client relationship with 
Strassberg & Ensor began in January 2006. Lewis Aff. (R. 1174) f 14. 
E. Dennis Moler's Deposition 
15. On October 10, 2006, Defendants deposed Dennis Moler. (R. 1177.) 
16. Defendants' counsel asked Mr. Moler several questions about 
conversations with his daughter, Wendy Moler-Lewis, in regard to Ms. Moler-Lewis' 
involvement with this litigation. (R. 1178-79.) 
17. Plaintiffs counsel objected to, and instructed Mr. Moler not to answer, 
questions relating to Wendy Moler-Lewis' actions as the representative of her parents in 
the current litigation. Id. 
18. Plaintiffs counsel's basis for the objection and instruction not to answer 
was that Ms. Moler-Lewis was a representative of Mr. Moler in regard to Mr. Moler's 
claims against Defendants and that Plaintiffs' counsel also represented Ms. Moler-Lewis 
in relation to this matter. Id. 
19. Defendants' counsel asked, and received answers to, questions relating to 
conversations between Mr. Moler and his other daughters in regard to the litigation 
because these daughters were not acting as the Molers' representative in this matter. 
(R. 1180.) 
20. Defendants' counsel also asked Mr. Moler several questions regarding his 
conversations with Ms. Moler-Lewis during the 2005-2005 time period, i.e., prior to the 
litigation. See, e.g., id. 
2L Plaintiffs' counsel did not object to questions relating to pre-litigation 
conversations because during that time period there was no attorney-client relationship, 
and those communications were not privileged. 
F. Defendants' Motion to Compel 
22. Defendants moved to compel the production of documents and further 
deposition testimony disclosing communications between the Moiers and their daughter, 
even when counsel for the Moiers was a party to the communications. (R. 977-79.) 
23. The Moiers opposed that motion on two primary grounds. First, the Moiers 
argued that Wendy Moler-Lewis was, under the express terms of Utah Rule of Evidence 
504, a "representative of the client" and therefore the Moiers had "a privilege to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing" communications to which she 
was a party. (R. 1160-63.) Second, the Moiers pointed out that Ms. Moler-Lewis was a 
client of Strassberg & Ensor, whose communications with the lawyers of that firm were 
therefore privileged. (R. 1162.) 
24. On December 28, 2006, the trial court entered an order granting 
Defendants' motion to compel (the "Order"). (R. 1379-80.) The trial court concluded 
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that Ms. Moler-Lewis was not an "agent" of her parents, but never addressed whether she 
was a "representative" as provided for under Rule 504. The trial court further ruled that, 
even if there were a privilege between the Molers and their daughter, it was waived when 
Mr. Moler testified in his deposition about conversations predating the commencement of 
litigation. (R. 1380.) 
xxin 
ARGUMENT 
L THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 504 ALLOWS 
MS. MOLER-LEWIS TO BE A "REPRESENTATIVE" OF HER PARENTS, 
AND HER COMMUNICATIONS WITH COUNSEL AND THE MOLERS 
WERE THEREFORE PROTECTED BY THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE. 
The fundamental issue presented on this appeal is whether the attorney-client 
privilege extends to communications that involve the client's designated representative— 
in this case, the clients' daughter. The analysis of this issue begins with the plain 
language of Utah Rule of Evidence 504, which sets forth this Court's articulation of the 
attorney-client privilege. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 504(b) states the general rule of privilege: 
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other 
person from disclosing confidential communications made for the 
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the 
client between the client and client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's 
representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common 
interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers lawyer's 
representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common 
interest, in any combination. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Rule of Evidence 504(a) states in unambiguous terms that the scope of the 
privilege extends to persons who are deemed "representatives" of the client, and thus 
makes it clear that conversations between the client and the Client's Representatives fall 
within the scope of the privilege, as do conversations between the attorney and the 
client's representative. The Rule defines a "representative of the client" as: "one having 
authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant 
thereto, on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with the 
lawyer concerning a legal matter." Id. Noticeably absent from this definition is any 
requirement that the assistance of the representative be "necessary" to the representation, 
or require that the representative be the equivalent of a legal "agent." 
The Molers and their counsel relied upon the plain language of Rule 504 when the 
Molers appointed Ms. Moler-Lewis as their representative, and shared with her privileged 
communications regarding the Molers' representation. The Molers presented evidence to 
the trial court establishing that Ms. Moler-Lewis had authority to, and did in fact, obtain 
legal services for her parents, and was authorized to communicate with Strassberg & 
Ensor concerning the Molers' lawsuit. (Moler Aff. (R. 1169) fflf 5, 8; Moler-Lewis Aff. 
(R. 1173-1174) 1flf 8, 12.) That evidence was unrebutted by Defendants. Indeed, the very 
creation of the attorney-client relationship was the result of Ms. Moler-Lewis' authorized 
actions on her parents' behalf. (Moler-Lewis Aff. (R. 1173) f 8 ("In approximately 
December 2005, as it became clear that litigation was inevitable, my parents asked me to 
help them identify and retain counsel to help handle the litigation.") 
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Ms. Moler-Lewis has also been involved in meetings and conversations between 
counsel and the Molers, and she helped review pleadings before they were filed. (Id f 
13.) She has on her own communicated with attorneys in connection with the lawsuit. 
(Id HTf 12-13.) 
When performing all these acts, Ms. Moler-Lewis was acting with the consent and 
knowledge of her parents. (Id. f^ 12; Moler Aff. (R. 1169) f 8.) Moreover, it is 
undisputed that Ms. Moler-Lewis is herself a client of Strassberg & Ensor. (Moler-Lewis 
Aff. (R. 1174-1175) J^ 14.) Thus, all communications between Strassberg & Ensor and 
Ms. Moler-Lewis, and all communications between the Molers and their daughter 
relating to the substance of this litigation, are privileged. 
The only circumstance in which this Court has held that the issue of "necessity" is 
relevant to a claim of privilege is wholly inapposite to the present situation. In Hoffman 
v. Conder, 712 P.2d 216 (Utah 1985), this Court addressed whether the presence of a 
nurse during a conversation between Mark Hoffman and his counsel resulted in a waiver 
of the attorney-client privilege. This Court concluded that, "[t]he proper standard is 
whether the third person's presence is reasonably necessary under the circumstances." 
IcL at 216-17. The Hoffman case did not address the situation presented here: whether a 
designated representative of a party is included within the scope of the attorney-client 
privilege. 
3 
Because the applicable rule (504(a)(4)) does not state that necessity is required, 
and does not provide that the representative must constitute a legal "agent," those terms 
should not be added by judicial decree. Members of the bar rely upon the plain language 
of the rules when determining with whom they can, and cannot, share privileged 
communications, and when advising their clients on these issues. Given the harm that 
flows from being forced to disclose to an adverse party communications that the rule 
states is protected from disclosure, the language of the rule must govern. 
If this Court had intended to include in the definition of a "representative of a 
client" a requirement that the representative's assistance be "reasonably necessary under 
the circumstances," or that the "representative" actually be an agent—a legal term of art 
with which the Court is undoubtedly familiar—such language would have been included 
in the rule itself. In fact, the phrase "reasonably necessary" appears in Rule of Evidence 
504(a)(6), which defines a communication as confidential if, "not intended to be 
disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the 
transmission of the communication." (Emphasis added.) Here, because Ms. Moler-
Lewis was a representative of her parents, the communications between and among the 
Molers, their counsel, and Ms. Moler-Lewis were by definition "in furtherance of the 
rendition of professional legal services to the client...", and thus there is no need to ask 
4 
whether Ms. Moler-Lewis' presence was "reasonably necessary for the transmission of 
the communication." Indeed, the communications Defendants moved to compel included 
"questions about whether Ms. Moler-Lewis assisted Mr. Moler and/or his counsel by 
reviewing the Complaint, Interrogatories, and Mr. Moier's letters to the parties and others 
... about the matters in dispute." (R. 981-982.) Such communications are related to "the 
rendition of professional legal services," and Defendants have never argued a contrary 
position. 
Even if the Molers were required to demonstrate that Ms. Moler-Lewis' 
participation in attorney-client communications was "reasonably necessary," the 
undisputed record evidence establishes this was the case. Mr. Moler testified in his 
affidavit that, prior to this lawsuit, the Molers "were never involved in civil litigation." 
(Moler Aff. (R. 1169) ^ 4.) Because the Molers were unfamiliar with the civil process 
and civil attorneys, they asked their daughter, a law school graduate who practiced law 
for several years, to help identify and select counsel and to assist with this litigation. (Id. 
J^ 6.) Thus, even if the Molers were required to show "reasonable necessity," the 
unrebutted testimony before the trial court demonstrates that Ms. Moler-Lewis' 
participation in the litigation process was "reasonably necessary" under the 
circumstances. Defendants proffered no evidence to the contrary. 
5 
Finally, ensuring the protection of the communications at issue in this case is 
wholly consistent with the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege. As this Court 
has recognized, "[t]he attorney-client privilege 'is intended to encourage candor between 
attorney and client and promote the best possible representation of the client.'" Doe v. 
Maret 1999 UT 74, % 7, 984 P.2d 980, quoting Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick 
Resources (USA), Inc., 901 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1990). The communications between 
and among the Molers, their daughter, and their counsel served but a single purpose: to 
ensure that the Molers obtained the best possible representation. There is nothing sinister 
or subversive about the Molers' desire to have their law degree-holding daughter look 
over the shoulders of their counsel, particularly given the Molers' inexperience in civil 
litigation. 
The attorney-client privilege extends to Ms. Moler-Lewis, and Defendants should 
be denied the opportunity to discover any communications between and among the 
Molers, their counsel, and Ms. Moler-Lewis. 
6 
II. BECAUSE NO PRIVILEGE EXISTED UNTIL MS. MOLER-LEWIS BEGAN 
SPEAKING WITH ATTORNEYS ON HER PARENTS' BEHALF, MR. MOLER 
DID NOT WAIVE THE PRIVILEGE BY TESTIFYING TO CONVERSATIONS 
WITH HIS DAUGHTER PRECEDING THE RETENTION OF COUNSEL. 
The trial court ruled that, even if Ms. Moler-Lewis were an "agent" of her parents, 
any privilege was waived when Mr. Moler testified about conversations with Ms. Moler-
Lewis that pre-dated her appointment as a representative. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 507(a) provides that waiver of a privilege occurs only 
where "the person or a predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or 
consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication, or 
fails to take reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure." Utah R. Evid. 507(a) 
(emphasis added). It is black letter law that testimony cannot constitute a waiver unless 
the testimony concerns the subject matter of a privileged communication. Hence, 
testimony to conversations that predate the existence of an attorney-client relationships 
cannot possibly give rise to a waiver. The Molers' counsel did not object to questions 
about communications between Mr. Moler and his daughter that pre-dated the creation of 
the attorney-client relationship because no privilege existed to protect those 
conversations. During the time period at issue (all times preceding Ms. Moler-Lewis5 
December phone calls with prospective attorneys), Ms. Moler-Lewis was not acting as 
7 
her parents' lawyer and counsel had not been retained, so there was no attorney-client 
relationship to which any privilege could have attached. 
In fact, before December 2005, there were no attorney-client communications at 
all, so Mr. Moler could not have disclosed "any significant part of the matter or 
communication" that is protected by the privilege by testifying about conversations 
before that date. Because Ms. Moler-Lewis was not acting as her parents' attorney or 
representative before December 2005, Mr. Moler answered questions regarding 
conversations with her parents predating December 2005 that were wholly unrelated to a 
legal representation that had not even begun. 
Specifically, the communications Defendants argued below gave rise to the waiver 
were "conversations [between Mr. Moler and] Ms. Moler-Lewis about his position on the 
Redfeather Homeowners Transition Committee, in light of his concerns about the 
CC&Rs." (R. 988.) While it is unclear precisely what testimony Defendants are 
referring to, and Defendants did not quote or attach any of Mr. Moler's testimony about 
these matters to either their original memorandum or reply, conversations about Mr. 
Moler's involvement in the Redfeather Homeowners' Association that predated any 
2
 In their memoranda below, Defendants did not identify the specific portion of the 
deposition transcript to which they referred, nor did they attach any portion of the 
transcript to support their waiver argument. This complete lack of evidence to support 
Defendants' waiver argument is another reason why the trial court's ruling was in error 
and should be reversed. 
8 
attorney-client relationship could not possibly give rise to a waiver. The Molers' counsel 
objected to all questions concerning communications with Ms. Moler-Lewis after the 
attorney-client relationship was formed, during which Ms. Moler-Lewis was acting as 
representative or agent to the current litigation because, as discussed above, those 
communications are protected as privileged under Rule 504. No waiver occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Molers respectfully request that this Court 
REVERSE the trial court's order granting Defendants' motion to compel. 
DATED this <$*day of May, 2007. 
YOUNG, HOFFMAN, STRASSBERG & ENSOR, LLP 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1125 
Salt Lake City, UT 8444)1 
Teleph6\e: (801)351 
Evan S. Stra 
Richard F. Elisor 
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF5TAND APPELLANTS 
DENNIS MOLER AND MARILYNN MOLER 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - NOVEMBER 8, 2006 
HONORABLE TYRONE E MEDLEY, JUDGE PRESIDING 
(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
PROCEEDINGS TELEPHONICALLY 
THE COURT: Okay. Are both - are all three of you 
still there rather? 
MR. STRASSBERG: Yes. 
MR. HOBBS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Four. Okay. We should be on the 
record at this time, and this is case numbered 060902661. 
And let's start by having counsel identify themselves for the 
record starting with counsel for plaintiffs. 
MR. STRASSBERG: Evan Strassberg and Rick Ensor on 
behalf of plaintiffs, and plaintiffs Dennis and Marilyn 
Moler, are with us. 
THE COURT: Counsel for defendants. Go ahead. 
MR. HOBBS: Lincoln Hobbs and Julie Ladel are here, 
and Bart Kunz is here representing Sunrise/Frequent Homes and 
Quint Heeder. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, counsel. 
know, this is the time that I set for ruling on 
motions that I have currently pending before me, 
going to do that at this time. I'm going to go 
initially say that - I guess I'm going to shift 
As you 
the three 
and I am 
- and let me 
the 
1 
1 responsibility to those parties who I've ruled in their favor 
2 to draft the order consistent with the ruling I'm about to 
3 announce unless you think you can collectively put together a 
4 joint order that you can stipulate to. That would be better 
5 for me. But in the event you can't do that, then the 
6 prevailing party will prepare the appropriate order. 
7 Let me go first to the defendant's motion for a 
8 protective order. Let me state first that I am going to deny 
9 the Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order. I'm doing 
10 that because I am unable to find, based upon what's been 
11 presented to me, that there has been a violation of Rule 4.2 
1 2 - 1 think it's subsection (d). That rule expressly states 
13 that when the represented person is an organization, an 
14 individual is represented by counsel for the organization if 
15 the individual is not separately represented with respect to 
16 the subject matter of the representation. And in this case, 
17 I'm finding that Mr. Cannon elected to be represented by his 
18 own counsel. Therefore, the contact that occurred between 
19 Mr. Strassberg and Mr. Ensor with Mr. Cannon through his 
20 retained counsel was not in violation of Rule 4.2(d). 
21 Let me also state that I've been invited by counsel 
22 for the defendants to exercise this court's inherent powers 
23 and authority to manage the practice of law before the court 
24 and officers of the court in an effort to maintain the 
25 integrity of trial proceedings, and under the facts and 
1 circumstances that have been presented to me in the context 
2 of this motion, I don't believe there are sufficient grounds 
3 for me to exercise that discretion. I'm doing so primarily 
4 because of the express language in Rule 4.2(d). In my view, 
5 that rule - it attempts to strike a balance between some 
6 competing interests, and I would note certainly that the 
7 balance that it attempts to strike I think is appropriate, 
8 and to the extent it isn't clearly - it's a legislative or 
9 rule making problem and not under the facts presented, a 
10 problem for this Court. I do think that there may very well 
11 be a set of circumstances out there where the court should 
12 exercise it's inherent authority, but I can't find that this 
13 case presents such a set of circumstances. But I am 
14 satisfied, however, that the motion - Defendant's Motion for 
15 Protective Order is not frivolous, not meritless, and in 
16 fact, while I think motions attempting to maintain that 
17 opposing counsel has violated ethical rules should not be 
18 made lightly, I don't find that this motion was, in fact, 
19 made lightly, and I think it was appropriate to bring the 
20 motion so this Court can have an opportunity to determine 
21 whether or not in a given set of circumstances it is 
22 appropriate for the court to exercise its inherent power. So 
23 this rule was - is in my view, is far from meritless. But at 
24 the same time, I'm resolving it by relying on the express 
25 language of the ruling and the circumstances which occurred 
1 here. So I am denying that motion. And inconsistent with 
2 the Plaintiff's request, I'm not awarding attorney's fees as 
3 it relates to that motion. 
4 I'd like to go next now to the Plaintiff's Motion 
5 to Compel. I've really struggled with this motion. But in 
6 the end, I've decided that I'm going to grant the Plaintiff's 
7 Motion to Compel because I am satisfied that in light of 
8 their pleadings, particularly their fraud claims, that this 
9 request is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible 
10 evidence which I think is the standard. Additionally, I am 
11 finding that I am not persuaded by the defendants' position 
12 that this request seeks irrelevant documents or that it is 
13 unduly burdensome. I am concerned about this kind of a 
14 request because clearly, it is broad enough that there is the 
15 risk that it could involve documents which have nothing 
16 involved with this particular case. I think that's pretty 
17 clear on its face. But in granting this motion, I am going 
18 to limit this request for discovery to only those files that 
19 are known to have Red Feather estate documents in them. That 
20 was a - and I'll just call it a suggestion that the 
21 plaintiffs made in their memoranda, and I am going to add 
22 that limitation. But with that limitation and combined with 
23 the fact that I was not persuaded, for example, that this 
24 request is unduly burdensome in terms of just pure volume. 
25 If I'd been persuaded of that, I would have been more likely, 
1 I think, to deny this motion to compel, because of its broad 
2 nature on its face, but without being persuaded that its 
3 unduly burdensome by way of just sheer volume, I'm not 
4 persuaded that the defendants' position that it's unduly 
5 burdensome because of some of the confidential nature of some 
6 of the documents. I'm going to find that that issue can be 
7 attenuated by the protective order that the parties have 
8 stipulated to in this particular case. So I am going to 
9 grant the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. 
10 Going next to the Defendants' Motion to Compel, let 
11 me say that I am going to also grant the Defendants' Motion 
12 to Compel. In granting that Motion to Compel, it also 
13 includes granting of the enlargement of time of two hours to 
14 continue the deposition. And I'm granting this motion, 
15 because I'm of the opinion that the communications between 
16 Mr. Moler and his daughter are not protected by the 
17 attorney/client privilege. She is not aware, did not provide 
18 legal advise based upon Mr. Moler's own admission in this 
19 Court's opinion. He is not her client. I think it was in 
20 some deposition testimony, Mr. Moler acknowledged that she 
21 was not his attorney. So in my view, the communications of 
22 Mr. Moler and his daughter are not protected by the 
23 attorney/client privilege. 
24 Additionally to the extent - even if I were to find 
25 that there was such protection, I would, as suggested by the 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
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20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
defendants, find that Mr. Moler waived the privilege. Even 
though, in my opinion it doesn't exist by his responses to 
the questions in the deposition, itself. 
It has been suggested that these communications are 
still protected because Ms. Moler-Lewis - and I think that is 
her last name - is an agent. And I'm going to find that is 
not the case in that under this set of circumstances, because 
I can't find the - that she was necessarily for the retention 
of the legal advise, nor that she was essential to 
plaintiff's representation, and in order for that to occur -
and let me back up a second. It is suggested by counsel for 
the plaintiffs that the common interest doctrine applies in 
this particular case and from my review of the case cite, I 
would agree that the controlling authority requires that that 
common interest be identical. In this Court's opinion, I'm 
finding that they are not identical. So consequently, I am 
going to grant the Defendants' Motion to Compel. 
Now, I think I'm correct about this next statement 
and if I'm not even giving you a chance to address it, even 
though I don't want to really entertain argument here this 
morning. 
fees, the 
compel, I 
The Defendants' Motion t 
plaintiffs in 
don't believe 
point - and keep in 
regarding attorneys' 
o Compel, I 
their memoranda, and 
requested 
mind, I haven' 
fees. But 
t reviewed 
fees. So I'm making an 
; think requested 
their motion to 
from my vantage 
an affidavit 
assumption here, 
6 
1 and my assumption may be incorrect. But it appears on its 
2 face, at least, that I've granted each party's Motion to 
3 Compel and it seems to me, that it is then unnecessary for me 
4 to consider respective claims for attorneys' fees because in 
5 essence, it's reasonably likely that they will cancel one 
6 another. So consequently, I'm inclined not to award fees on 
7 either motion, but I do recognize - I make that statement 
8 without the benefit of having reviewed affidavits in support. 
9 That's the matter on which I'm going to rule. What 
10 do you think the chances are you can submit to me one order 
11 that will contain the substance of that determination? 
12 MR. STRASSBERG: We'd be happy to attempt to do 
13 that, Your Honor. I think we can do it. 
14 MR. HOBBS: One order with respect to all three? 
15 THE COURT: Yeah. Do you see any problem about 
16 that? 
17 MR. HOBBS: I don't. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. What if I gave you 10 days from 
19 today to get that submitted to me. If that fails, then the 
20 prevailing parties will submit the proposed order consistent 
21 with Rule 7(f). Okay? 
22 MR. HOBBS: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
23 THE COURT: Oh, one last item. My clerk is 
24 bringing to my attention. I keep forgetting the issue of 
25 mediation in this particular case. Now keep in mind that 
1 right at this moment, I don't have before me the case 
2 management order which I'm assuming is in place in this 
3 particular case, I'm going to be honest with you. I really 
4 don't have the time to get it right now, because I'm really 
5 pressed - a very tight calendar this morning, but I wanted to 
6 discuss with you - and I don't think we've had this 
7 discussion yet. I've changed my process in handling civil 
8 cases a couple of months ago and that change has resulted in 
9 me building into civil cases at the time the case management 
10 order is entered a requirement that the parties participate 
11 in good faith in mediation in an attempt to resolve the case 
12 and share the expenses of mediation. I want to build that 
13 mandatory requirement into this particular case, but I would 
14 need your input as to when the most appropriate and most 
15 effective time would be for building in such a requirement. 
16 Who wishes to take a stab at that first in terms of when the 
17 appropriate time would be? Silence. 
18 MR. HOBBS: Judge, this is Lincoln Hobbs. We have 
19 about - oh, less, about two weeks more until discovery 
20 cutoff. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. HOBBS: At the conclusion of discovery cutoff, 
23 I anticipate filing a motion to dismiss on behalf of Mr. 
24 McCandless and C.W. Management. I don't know whether it 
25 would be appropriate for that to be filed and then have 
1 mediation, or filed and heard, and then mediation because 
2 obviously, the plaintiff's counsel are going to disagree with 
3 my prospects on that, but I think my prospects with respect 
4 to Mr. McCandless and C.W. Management are pretty good. That 
5 having been said, you know, 1 would realize upon filing a 
6 motion, it may very well be tonight. So I mean it seems to 
7 me that, from my perspective - and I jumped in because of the 
8 silence - it would seem to me be after the discovery cutoff 
9 and after filing that motion, but before it's ruled upon. 
10 And I guess we could leave it to the plaintiffs to decide if 
11 they wanted to file a responsive pleading for the mediation 
12 or not. 
13 MR. STRASSBERG: On behalf of the plaintiffs, Your 
14 Honor. That's fine with us if Mr. Hobbs intends to file that 
15 motion. I don't think we care too much one way or the other 
16 with respect to the timing of filing a response. I think it 
17 would effectively address whatever issues he may be raising -
18 THE COURT: Now, then -
19 MR. STRASSBERG: - either in a brief or just orally 
20 through the mediation. So -
21 THE COURT: The only preference I would have, and 
22 it's - the only preference I would have is that at a minimum 
23 that the motion be filed prior to mediation. So whoever 
24 performs the mediation can at least have that in their - on 
25 the radar screen as these discussions occur. Now, with that 
9 
1 stated, I'd like to set an order before a date this morning. 
2 What would be the appropriate time to set that? In other 
3 words, it could be a date that mediation would be required to 
4 be complete on or before a certain day. 
5 MR. HOBBS: Jumping in again, Your Honor. This is 
6 Lincoln Hobbs. My only thought on that would be - in theory 
7 we could do it in December. I'm going to be gone for a good 
8 portion of December. Plus, December is December with all of 
9 - with everything that carries with it. I would think pick 
10 sometime mid-January. 
11 THE COURT: So if I were to say - just a second. 
12 On or before Friday, January the 19th? 
13 MR. STRASSBERG: Fine with the plaintiffs, Your 
14 Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. What will happen, is my clerk is 
16 going to send you a minute entry and order with that 
17 mediation date requirement in it. Okay? 
18 MR. HOBBS: Okay. 
19 MR. STRASSBERG: Okay. 
20 THE COURT: All right. Hey, listen. Thank you 
21 very much. 
22 MR. STRASSBERG: Thank you, Your Honor. 
23 MR. HOBBS: Thank you. 
24 J THE COURT: Okay, bye. 
{Whereupon the hearing was concluded) ed) -c-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DENNIS MOLER, an individual, and ) 
MARILYNN MOLER, an individual, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
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SUNRISE CAPITAL CORPORATION, LLC, ) 
a Utah Limited Liability Corporation, ] 
CW MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, ; 
a Utah Corporation, CHRISTOPHER ] 
McCANDLESS, an individual, FRANKLIN ; 
HOMES, INC., a Utah Corporation, and 
QUINN HEDER, an individual, 
Defendants. 
j ORDER ON 
MOTIONS TO COMPEL AND 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
i Case No. 060902661 
) Judge Tyrone Medley 
On November 6, 2006, the following motions came before the Court: (1) Defendants 
Franklin Homes, Inc., Sunrise Capital LLC, Christopher McCandless and CW Management 
Corporation's Motion for a Protective Order ("Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order"); (2) 
Defendants' Joint Motion to Compel the Testimony of Dennis Moler and Wendy Moler-Lewis 
and for an Enlargement of the Length of Time of the Deposition of Dennis Moler ("Defendants' 
Motion to Compel"); and (3) Plaintiffs Dennis and Marilynn Moler's First Motion to Compel 
("Plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel"). Having considered the memoranda submitted by counsel 
and having heard oral argument, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for a Protective 
Order and GRANTS both Defendants' Motion to Compel and Plaintiffs* First Motion to Compel. 
With respect to Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order, the Court finds that there was 
no violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2. That Rule expressly states that when the 
represented person is an organization, an individual is represented by counsel for the 
organization if the individual is not separately represented with respect to the subject matter of 
the communication. In this case, Mr. Cannon elected to be represented by his own counsel and, 
therefore, the contact that occurred between Strassberg & Ensor and Mr. Cannon, through his 
retained counsel, was not in violation of Rule 4.2(d). In addition, while the Court has been 
invited to exercise its inherent power and authority to manage the practice of law before the 
Court and the officers of the court, the Court finds insufficient grounds to exercise such 
discretion in this case. The express language of Rule 4.2(d) attempts to strike a balance between 
competing interests, which balance this Court believes is appropriate. To the extent Rule 4.2 is 
not clearly expressed, it is a problem for the rule makers and not this Court. While there may be 
a set of circumstances where the Court's inherent authority should be exercised, the Court finds 
that this case does not present such a set of circumstances. Nevertheless, the Court finds that 
Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order was not frivolous, not meritless, and not made lightly, 
and that it was appropriate for Defendants to provide the Court with an opportunity to decide 
whether to exercise such inherent authority. The Court therefore denies Plaintiffs' requests for 
attorney's fees and costs. 
With respect to Defendants' Motion to Compel, the Court grants the motion, including an 
enlargement of two hours to continue the deposition of Dennis Moler. The Court finds that 
communications between Mr. Moler and his daughter, Ms. Wendy Moler-Lewis, are not 
protected by the attorney/client privilege. Ms. Moler-Lewis did not provide legal advice based 
upon Mr. Moler's own admission during deposition testimony that he is not her client. The 
Court would also find that, even if the attorney-client privilege did exist, Mr. Moler waived the 
privilege in his deposition. The Court further finds that Ms. Moler-Lewis cannot be considered 
Mr. Moler's agent for purposes of this litigation because the Court cannot find that she was 
necessary for the retention of legal advice or essential to Mr, Moler's legal representation. It is 
also suggested by Plaintiffs' counsel that the common interest doctrine applies in this particular 
case. From the Court's review of the cases cited, the controlling authority requires that the 
common interest must be identical In the Court's opinion, Ms. Moler-Lewis' interests and 
Dennis Moler's interests are not identical in this case. 
With respect to Plaintiffs' First Motion to Compel, the Court grants that Motion because 
it is satisfied that in light of Plaintiffs' pleadings in this matter, particularly their fraud claims, 
that this request is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, which is the relevant 
standard. Additionally, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants' position that this request 
seeks irrelevant documents or that this request is unduly burdensome. The Court is concerned 
about the breadth of the requests and, in granting this Motion, limits the request to discovery of 
only those files that are known to contain Redfeather Estates documents. The Court declines to 
grant the costs and attorney fees incurred in bringing Plaintiffs1 First Motion to Compel. 
SO ORDERED this PJ^day of D^<^ , 2006 
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Hiincoln W. H o 6 b s ( J U 
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